Elites and Masses, States and Nations:Interactions in the Nation-building Process and the 'Global Age' by Hedetoft, Ulf Riber
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Elites and Masses, States and Nations
Interactions in the Nation-building Process and the 'Global Age'
Hedetoft, Ulf Riber
Publication date:
2002
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hedetoft, U. R. (2002). Elites and Masses, States and Nations: Interactions in the Nation-building Process and
the 'Global Age'. Aalborg Universitet.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 22/2002 
 
 
ELITES AND MASSES, STATES AND NATIONS: 
INTERACTIONS IN THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS  
AND THE “GLOBAL AGE”. 
 
  
 
by 
 
Ulf Hedetoft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPIRIT 
School for Postgraduate 
Interdisciplinary Research on 
Interculturalism and Transnationality 
 
Aalborg University 
8 Ulf Hedetoft 
 
ISSN 1397-9043 
 
Published by: 
SPIRIT 
Aalborg University 
Fibigerstraede 2 
Dk-9220 Aalborg OE, Denmark 
 
Phone + 45 96 35 71 95 
Fax     + 45 98 15 11 26 
http://www.humsamf.auc.dk/spirit 
 
SPIRIT – School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research   
  on Interculturalism and Transnationality  
 
Directors: Jean Monnet Professor Staffan Zetterholm & Associate Professor Henrik 
Halkier 
 
SPIRIT is an interdisciplinary doctoral school for the systematic study of themes and 
theoretical issues related to the intertwining of political, transnational and intercultural 
processes in the contemporary world.   
It is dedicated to examining – from the combined vantage point of both the human and 
the social sciences – cultural, political and communicative issues on a spectrum 
ranging from the local dimension over the national and the regional to the processes of 
globalisation that increasingly impinge on the organisation of life and the structure and 
dynamics of the world.   
The thematic issues range from questions of European nationalism or European 
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perspective reaching from pre-modern to contemporary Europe.  
Considerable emphasis is placed on Europe - its history, politics, social anthropology, 
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ELITES AND MASSES, STATES AND NATIONS: INTERACTIONS IN THE NATION-
BUILDING PROCESS AND THE “GLOBAL AGE” COMPARED1 
 
 
 
Ulf Hedetoft 
Institute for History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper explores the nature of national identity and national movements in Europe 
with particular focus on mass/elite configurations in the era of the nation-building 
process (19th and part of the 20th century – phase 1) and in the present-day “global 
age” (phase 2). The pivotal reference points will the two “turns of century”: from the 
19th to the 20th, and from the 20th to the 21st. This also implies that although the two 
“phases” understood as broad historical processes comprise different sub-phases (in 
varying national configurations), the argument in the paper is predominantly focussed 
on a comparison between the state of nationalism in the late 19th and the late 20th 
century, respectively.  
 
The objectives are, first, to shed light on two phases in the history of nationalism 
where the interaction between “the national” and “the global” is crucial, in order to 
establish if it is true, as some contend, that globalization is nothing new and we have 
seen most of it before (e.g. Hirst & Thompson, 1996.). And, second, to foreground 
specific similarities and differences in the mass/elite nexus (and its links with national 
movements) at a time when the modern nation-state was coming into its own and 
another when (some say) it is in a state of decline.  
 
In this light, the paper sets out to 
 
 analyze the normative status of national movements and national discourse in 
the two phases (section 2); 
 
 identify the underlying political or ideological rationale and the principal agents 
of nationalism (key distinction: “peasants into Frenchmen” vs “the revolt of the 
elites”), and in this context discuss the material vs the non-material aspects of 
national movements (key distinction: functional vs existential aspects of 
belonging) (section 3); 
                                                 
1This was first written as a keynote paper for the conference National Identities and National 
Movements in European History, 15-16 March, 2002, Catholic University of Leuven and Ghent 
University, Belgium. See www.arts.kuleuven.ac.be/nationalism. I would like to thank Lærke Holm for 
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The paper forms the basis for a chapter in a 
forthcoming book on The Global Turn: Nationalist Encounters With The World. 
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 contrast the symbolic rationale of national movements in phase 1 with their 
status and formats today, in the context of the different roles of memory and 
mission in the two phases (section 4); 
 finally reflect on the different discourses and objectives of racism, anti-
immigration movements and time-specific constructions of Others, with respect 
to interests, grievances and visions of interactions between national egoism and 
international collaboration. In this context the impact of war and war talk – their 
presence or absence, legitimacy or non-legitimacy, old or new discursive forms 
– will be addressed (section 5). 
 
The argument has a predominant theory-developing perspective, but draws on cases 
and illustrative material from different national European contexts. 
 
2. MODALITIES AND NORMATIVITIES OF NATIONALISM 
Phase 1: The most basic point to make is that in the late 19th century nationalism and 
national movements in Europe enjoyed widespread legitimacy. In spite of their 
different forms and manifestations both within and across different countries, they had 
increasingly come to be seen as a civilizing force, as a symbolic and material vehicle 
of modernity. To be a “nationalist” or a “patriot” was not, as in Dr Johnson’s days, a 
euphemism for a scoundrel, or, as in our own age, a rather aggressive or wistfully 
nostalgic label, but was becoming the epithet of modernist, future-oriented 
respectability2 – even if some “nationalisms” would be better described as “statisms” 
(like Bismarck’s Germanism or British Imperial Nationalism) and their driving force 
was less patriotic love of country and popular representation than hard-nosed reasons 
of state. Nevertheless even such statist and imperialist ambitions played themselves 
out within the framework of organic nationalism. “The national” was positive 
ideology, representing an ideal unity of the social, the cultural and the political – in 
fact, of people and state, though the “nationalization of the masses” (Mosse, 1975) had 
reached different levels and had penetrated differently into the hearts and minds of 
different social and regional sections of the population in the various European 
countries. But at least at the level of elite discourse and agenda-setting political and 
popular movements, the national paradigm was widely accepted both as a legitimate 
form of social, political and economic reference and as a powerful motive force of a 
burgeoning democratic modernity. 
 
In terms of the three-type division of nationalism into imperative, indicative and 
subjunctive forms that I have outlined elsewhere (Hedetoft, 1995), nationalism in the 
late 19th century in Europe oscillated between imperative and subjunctive modalities. 
On the one hand it was a top-down, state-induced and territoriality motivated political 
and cultural organizing principle – figuratively speaking an edict by the powers-that-
be to “the people” to fall emotionally and allegiance-wise in line with its ruling cadres. 
This is the conservative version of nationalism which ultimately produced European 
                                                 
2 In the light of the resistance to nationalism mounted by the 1st Socialist International one ought to 
add: and bourgeois. 
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racism and fascism. On the other side of the medal we find the national imaginary, the 
push from below toward national-ethnic homogeneity, toward fulfilling both 
Rousseau’s ideal of direct representation and Heine’s nocturnal dreams of Germany.3 
This is nationalism in the subjunctive mode: if only it were so...; and could it come to 
be...; and were it so, things would be perfect. Of course, “state” enters into this vision 
too, but from the other side, as a needed instrument to keep the nation together and 
protect it from outside threats, and also as symbolic representation of the (supposed) 
unity that it springs from. Importantly, neither of the two modes can confidently take 
the existence of nation-states and national identities for granted. There’s an incipient 
morality of nationalism in the making, whose prime virtues are intra-societal 
solidarity, a commitment to sacrifice and heroism in the national interest, and a belief 
in the superior qualities of one’s own nation (more often than not racially justified). 
But as yet there’s no solidified Grand Narrative of the National, nor has the narrative 
transformed into mainstream “banality” (Billig, 1995). Nationalism, in different 
combinations, is therefore a mix, sometimes a very uneasy one, between (on the one 
hand) imperially or aristocratically inspired centralist directivity and state- and market-
driven interests, and (on the other hand) popular-nationalist ardour to create “one’s 
own” institutions of power, bottom-up pressure on states for cultural and linguistic 
concessions (sometimes to the point of demanding secession from an established 
“empire” state), and claims-making movements for democratic rights and recognition. 
 
The specific configurations of imperative and subjunctive modalities and the 
consequent national movements depend a lot on the avenue taken to construct national 
modernity in particular countries or regions. Theodor Schieder’s suggestion that we 
distinguish between a territorially incorporative, a unificatory and a secessionist path 
(Schieder, 1992) is analytically and heuristically useful in this respect. In the first 
category we find e.g. England and France, with state structures, institutions and 
territorial boundaries reasonably in place before the “advent” of nationalism – 
structures, institutions and boundaries that undergo a politically and socially 
transformative process in the nation-building phase, violent and fragmentary in France, 
smoother and more “continuous” in England, but all the same offer an established 
framework to tap into, reform or even revolutionize. By the turn of the 20th century, 
political establishments of both countries are engaged in similar problems, i.e. how – 
on the basis of centralized administrative structures – to nationalize the masses of 
colonial metropoles and win over the hearts and minds of people(s) within their 
territories. On the part of nationalist elites and movements, these attempts involved 
both “external” and “internal” colonialisms, but in the perspective of nationalism the 
latter is the more important: how to overcome regional separatisms and local 
attachments or at least subordinate them to and make them functional for the national 
cause. In this format, nationalism is imperative first, and only secondarily subjunctive. 
 
The second type, unificatory nationalism, is what we find in e.g. Germany and Italy. 
This is a nationalism and an interaction between nationalist and statist movements 
marked by violent and discontinuous showdowns between representatives of the 
                                                 
3 In other words, this distinction, between imperative and subjunctive, is not the equivalent of the – 
imagined more than real – difference between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. 
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“political imperative” (institutional modernism) and cultural-visionary representatives 
of the national imaginary, as witnessed by the German conflict between a Klein- and a 
Grossdeutschland, or between the national vision of a Mazzini and a Garibaldi in Italy. 
Here nationalism is imperative and subjunctive at the same time, but organized in 
parallel and constantly engaged in a cultural and political struggle to define “rightful” 
territory, proper institutions, criteria for national citizenship and belonging, and 
popular influence on state and government. Toward the end of the century, in both 
countries the champions of the raison d’etat are at the helm of state, 4 but they are also 
losing out in the wider intra-European competition for global resources and influence, 
all of this pointing ahead to the fascist trajectory (where the imperative mode of 
nationalism is absolute) followed in both countries after WW I. 
 
The secessionist type, characteristic of most Central and East European national paths, 
represents the reverse of this. Here nationalism (mimetic in the sense that it looks 
“west” for role models and support) is predominantly subjunctive, represented by 
ambitious social and regional groups excluded from or at least marginalized in relation 
to the opportunity structures offered to the people of “the center”, and therefore locked 
into a more or less hopeless fight against absolutist and agrarian-based “multicultural” 
empires like those of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Where, in unificatory 
nationalism, imperative and subjunctive nationalisms have each their own kind of 
programs, visions and social movements, in this third type there’s a total rupture: the 
state imperative runs counter to any modern vision of nationalism, and subjunctive 
nationalism feeds on a combination of powerlessness, grievance and sentiments 
steeped in righteousness. Only through external intervention (WW I, the dissolution of 
the three great empires and the adoption of national self-determination as an 
international norm) did some of the nationalist movements in Central and Eastern 
Europe (and the Irish Free State!) achieve secession. 
 
Nationalism in this phase in Europe represents a comprehensive “project”, politico-
economic as well as cultural and social, to overcome and reshape the colonial and 
dynastic forms of “globality” which characterized the 19th century. The phase marks 
the entry of “the people” on the social and political stage, both as a material driving 
force and ideological rampart of political ambitions. The normative justification for 
this nationalism is moral and universalistic (notwithstanding the particularistic thrust 
of all nationalisms): sovereignty in its popular manifestation; the illegitimacy of 
arbitrary aristocratic and despotic rule (in other parts of the world this turned into 
colonial independence movements); the defense against international socialism; 
enlightenment rationality; the appropriateness of self-governance; the freedom of the 
individual; but also (enter particularism!) the immorality or inferiority of the 
nationalism of the Other(s) (see section 5 below). In this last respect, national morality 
was to a significant extent buttressed by “scientific” racism and mainstream political 
philosophy. 
 
                                                 
4 And particularly in Germany defining their nationalism – policies as well as discourses – as a 
counter-measure to international socialism. 
 5
Phase 2: In the meantime, something important has happened to the normative 
currency and broadly based legitimacy of nationalism and national movements. On the 
one hand, nationalism today exists in the indicative mode: it is there, has a political 
container (the nation-state) which functions as a naturalized reference-point and 
umbrella for citizens’ national identities, and pivots around a series of “banalities” 
(Billig, 1995) that more or less consciously frame people’s social and cultural lives 
and feelings of belonging – thus conditioning their practice as well as their mental 
dispositions. In a sense, it is also subjunctive, since both people and elites generally 
harbour images of a better, fairer, more humane, communitarian and also more 
functional nation-state, and often cultivate national traditions and cherish wistful 
memories of the national past. Nationalism, in the meaning of imagined communities, 
still has a firm grip on the popular imaginary. 
 
On the other hand, however, this specific modality nexus between national 
indicativeness and subjunctiveness is lined with a sceptical edge that detracts from the 
normative acceptability of nationalism and makes “national movements” a somewhat 
doubtful proposition to engage in. This “legitimacy gap” is primarily caused by five 
factors in different configurations: the WW II legacy and the linkage of nationalism 
and international aggressiveness; the functional dilution of the welfare state; the 
backward-looking tendency of national identities; the globalization and 
Europeanization of the core elites and the partial decoupling of interests from 
identities; and the fact that ideological nationalism and national movements have been 
discursively appropriated by anti-immigrant, anti-European and anti-globalizing 
groups at the margins of the social or political continuum. (For more on these 
specifics, see the next section.) 
 
The most important general point is probably that nationalism is no longer an 
indubitably legitimate and forward-looking ideology for the progressive historical 
elites in Europe (the situation is slightly different in the United States)5. Rather it has 
developed (some would probably say degraded) into being a repository for historical 
sentimentalism and backward-looking nostalgia. In a very real sense, nationalism is 
somehow dated. In the current climate of transnationality and globalization – i.e. elite 
networking across borders – , it no longer or only very partially contains a tenable 
vision for the future in economic, social or political terms.6 There is a significant 
process of “uneven development” at work here, between the pervasive and continuing 
survival of nationalism as sentiment and popular identity, and on the other hand its 
“functional degradation” (“re-functionalization” might be a better term) in economic, 
welfare-dependent and sovereignty-oriented terms – if, say, compared with the 
                                                 
5 Because in the only remaining superpower, nationalism, as a unique mix of “ethnic”, “cultural” and 
“political” belonging, is not just still legitimate, but to a large extent still carried by a close linkage to 
militant, war-derived images and a widespread cult of military sacrifices and civic heroism, all 
embedded in an American belief in the manifest destiny of the USA and its global mission as a 
defender of civilizational values. See also section 5, phase 2 below. 
6 This does not mean that national elites pursue supranational interests, but that in their pursuit of 
national interests they are increasingly compelled to apply transnational remedies. Hence the potential 
decoupling of “national interest” and “national identity”, “elites” and “masses” in e.g. EU member 
states. 
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material and ideological workings or the welfare-state regimes constructed during the 
first 25 years after WW II.  
 
Increasingly nationalism and nationalist discourses encapsulate and articulate a series 
of defensive dimensions: a receptacle of sentimental attachments, protector against 
(too much) transnationality, safeguard against the decoupling of national masses from 
their elected elites, barrier against unwelcome immigration, display case of moral 
virtues and superior qualities (e.g. in the sports arena), and a space of historically 
constructed homeness and rootedness. Whereas these powerful parameters of 
nationalism attempt to retain the nation-state in a format that can be imagined as 
traditional, enduring and relatively stable, the factual interface between the nation-state 
and the global arena which it is increasingly dependent on for its functionality by and 
large contradicts this musealized stereotype. As in phase 1, nationalism – now less 
legitimate and carried much less uniformly by the elites of historical progress – 
attempts to resist, reshape or constrain the consequences of “globality” for the nation-
state and its national identity. The crucial difference is that where in the late 19th 
century nationalism carried the ball of history and the core elites were unflinchingly on 
its side, contemporary “cosmopolitan” elites now pursue “national interests” through 
avenues that cohere in a piecemeal fashion only with the defensive-nostalgic nexus of 
indicative and subjunctive nationalism.  
 
It is the progress of nationalism itself throughout the 20th century and its victory over 
19th century “globality” which have produced a different configuration of global-
national vectors that increasingly privileges this new burgeoning globality and imposes 
on the nation-state a requirement to transsubstantiate (e.g. by going transnational), if it 
is to remain functional and adequate at all. This new configuration is well reflected in 
the progress of International Relations theories from the early to the late 20th century, 
from Realism (giving priority to the supremacy, power and sovereignty of the nation-
state) through Neo-Realism (maintaining the nation-state as the central “unit”, but 
acknowledging the “system” as overdetermining) to Liberal Institutionalism and 
different variants of Constructivism (in both of which trans- and supranational forces 
as well as the liminalities of the traditional interaction between the National and the 
Global are conspicuous) (see e.g. Czempiel & Rosenau, 1989; George, 1994). 
 
In this context nationalism (as identity), deprived of its original raison d’etre and 
instruments, acquires a jaded patina of socio-psychological compensation and 
consolation for the less privileged masses and the less upbeat elites as well. Evidence 
of this can be found, inter alia, in the fact that even the most nationally minded 
champions and ideologues of the sovereign national welfare state cannot but argue 
their case through discourses of international commitment: whenever they have an axe 
to grind with the “globalizers”, they rarely take explicit exception with the global 
perspective inherent in the opposing vision as such, but rather criticize this vision for 
not being genuinely international. 
 
Without wanting at this point to enter into the specifics of the question, it must be 
emphasized that this diagnosis of the transformations under way is couched and 
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conceived in highly general terms. In other words, it does not explicitly address – but 
it does recognize – the fact that these developments have assumed and still assume 
different (political, discursive, affective) forms in different nation-state contexts. The 
processes are different in, say, Germany (where WW II immediately led to a 
questioning of nationalism), Spain (where the same process has taken much longer, 
e.g. due to Francoism and regional nationalism), Britain (a state of national pride and 
wartime glory, where national identity and nationalistic discourses are still pervasive, 
vying with cosmopolitanism of the New Labour brand) and Denmark (where small-
nation exceptionalism and welfare-state mentality still coalesce to produce widespread 
scepticism toward global and European processes). And these are no more than 
examples; all nation-states follow each their own road toward (a recognition of) the 
new configuration and its inherent normativities.7 But the logic of global processes is, 
by their very nature, that they all have to follow one of these roads. This necessity 
springs from the rationale of the changing interaction. 
 
3. RATIONALE AND AGENTS OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS 
Phase 1: The question now is how and why we come to witness a change from a phase 
typified by both an agenda-setting nationalistic discourse and a corresponding social 
and cultural, elite-driven process of “peasants into Frenchmen” (as Eugen Weber’s 
well-known work called it) to something like Lasch’s “revolt of the elites” and their 
betrayal of national democracy (Lasch, 1995), in an age where nationalism has 
gradually seen its absolute legitimacy being questioned.  
 
There is obviously a deep connectedness between the two parts of this question – the 
social on the one hand, the normative on the other. To a large extent, the legitimacy of 
nationalism and nationalist discourses in the early phase can be accounted for by the 
gradual confluence of various elite sub-strata behind the cause of the National and 
their concerted attempts to disseminate nationalism to “the people” (which is both a 
discursive reference point of nationalist agitation and a de facto social construction of 
the same). Inversely, the “progressiveness” of these strata resided in their embracing 
nationalism both as ideology, political program and cultural strategy, and, of course, in 
the fact that, in spite of hitches and glitches which detracted from its reputation, it 
proved a resounding success worldwide. And as regards our own age, the more 
doubtful and certainly less hegemonic standing of nationalism must be related to its 
more ambiguous functionality for progressive elites and their correspondingly more 
ambiguous and complex discourses of identity, purpose and instruments. In other 
words, we must recognize an endogenous structural relationship between legitimacy 
and normativity on the one hand, and the teleology and discourses of what I prefer to 
term “core elites” on the other. The correlation is central but also, in a sense, begs the 
question, since it does not answer the question of causality, i.e. how the two factors are 
                                                 
7 One of the semantic/semiotic manifestations of these normativities is evident in the meanings and 
uses of the distinction between “national” and “nationalist”, usually with the former as the overtly 
denotative and neutral designation and the latter as the connotative and value-charged one (normally 
the value assignment is negative). Following this logic, it is fine to pursue “national interests” or to 
have a “national identity” as long as these are not articulations of “nationalist” inclinations.  
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related and why elite discourses of legitimacy have changed – unless, of course, one’s 
approach is voluntaristic, identifying “causality” in the historical whims and arbitrary 
preferences of particular resourceful and powerful personalities (cultural, intellectual 
and political). However, without doubting the significant, even indispensable role of 
such historical actors (Brass, 1991; Hroch, 1985; Kappeler, 1992; Eugen Weber, 
1976), this is not a tenable theoretical position (not even in a constructivist 
framework), since it neglects and ignores more “systemic” factors. We need therefore 
to unearth other and more general reasons for the change from what could heuristically 
be termed “nationalist modernity” to “global postmodernity”. In this sub-section, the 
focus will be on the former. 
 
There is obviously no need to reiterate the important insights of scholars like Gellner, 
Greenfeld, Hroch, Max Weber and others into the modernizing functionalities of 19th 
century nationalism in economic, social and political terms, but rather to capture the 
essence and synthetic meaning of their work as regards the change under scrutiny in 
this paper. At the level of simple description, the nationalizing developments at work 
in the late 19th century can be formulated as elite-driven processes to construct 
relatively autonomous, territorially bounded political and economic units, whilst in the 
process reshaping the social groupings within those boundaries into “national 
peoples”, in other words overcome internal divisiveness, create horizontal and vertical 
homogeneities, and thus push not just industrialization and the market economy 
forward, but also consolidate and expand the power base of the nation-state in the 
making – both domestically and in the larger world.  
 
The significant development as compared with earlier stages of nationalism, where 
“top-down” and “bottom-up”, state-carried and imaginatively conceived nationalisms 
and corresponding elites and strategies vyed with each other, and where what 
Greenfeld (1992) has called the nationalist transvaluation process (learning through 
mimesis and ressentiments) was at work as a shaper and disseminator of nationalism, 
is that in the late 19th century the nationalizing process had started to emancipate itself 
from its economic, social and cultural underpinnings and to assume an independent 
international and political rationale. Where hitherto only a few states had developed a 
nation and a nationalism for themselves,8 the situation was different around the turn of 
the century. And more importantly, where up until then states had by and large seen 
their primary goal to be the establishment and consolidation of the requisite conditions 
of the nation-state, at the turn of the century the relationship was beginning to be 
reversed: the national economies and their immanent rationale were being harnessed to 
political and imperial objectives in most European states, and the nationalist agitation 
of political elites was directed at the masses not just in order to make them good and 
law-abiding citizens in a domestic framework, but to construct strong political 
identities that clearly distinguished between “us” and “them” and which could be 
called upon in situations of national crisis and war. Clearly not all nationalist processes 
ran in parallel, and there are exceptions due to “uneven developments”, time lags, or 
other circumstances – e.g. in Denmark, where the defeat to Prussia in 1864 had led to a 
                                                 
8 The world, including Europe, was fundamentally asymmetrical in these terms: while Heine was still 
dreaming of Germany in the night, England’s colonially based nationalism was far advanced. 
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domestic focus on the economic trajectories for a modernization of the Danish society 
and a retreat from international involvements.9 In general, however, the most 
significant crucible for the creation of European nationalism as an all-societal and all-
encompassing phenomenon of political, cultural and existential identity were the 
fundamentally imperial processes of international competition and mutual grievances 
in Europe between c. 1880 and 1914, the concomitant political discourses of national 
history, memory, glory and future goals, and the acceptance by the peoples of the 
soldiery virtues they were asked to internalize and demonstrate.10 War – real or 
imagined – proved to be an invaluable nationalist mobilizer, and the image of 
particular national self-identities became virtually inseparable from the mental 
construction and cultural representations of the Negative Other. Thus the pacific, non-
exclusivist images of national character and culture propounded by Herder, Kant, 
Locke, Goldsmith and other intellectuals in the age of Enlightenment and 
Romanticism fell prey to the more ferocious “models” put forward (or inspired) by 
people like Hobbes, Arndt, Treitschke and Hegel – and their political incarnations, 
Napoleon, Bismarck, Disraeli, and so forth. 
 
I do not want to be misunderstood: I am not arguing that imperial ambitions and inter-
state competition are the exhaustive explanation for nationalism and national 
identities. On the contrary, they would not have been possible had the necessary 
economic, socio-cultural and legal-philosophical groundwork not been put place 
previously; in addition, there are undoubtedly valid economic and political reasons for 
nation-states and nationalism independently of the processes on which I focus here, 
reasons that constitute the explanatory framework for the transition of the individual 
from the status of “subject” to that of democratic “citizen”. What I do argue, however, 
is that in the late 19th century and for some time to come, agenda-setting European 
states, having emancipated themselves from and subordinated “civil society” to their 
own relatively independent purposes, developed an emphatic and thoroughgoing 
exclusionary interest in promoting the national identities of their citizens and a 
powerful nation/state integrative compact due to the teleology they were almost all 
pursuing: colonizing the remains of the globe, retaining imperial rule, combating 
socialism at home and abroad, harnessing the economy to military purposes, keeping a 
cautious eye on one’s European neighbours, entering into the most suitable alliances, 
etc. This imparted to nationalism and national identity (then mostly referred to as 
“national characters”) an unquestioned and historically unprecedented legitimacy, 
since they were key to success in a struggle which per se had little to do with the 
national fervour of romantic imaginings. 
                                                 
9 A central figure in these developments in Denmark was N.F.S. Grundtvig, priest, writer and 
politician combined, one of the founding fathers of the Danish High School Movement and an 
eloquent and influential cultural personality. His strong views on the strengths and virtues of 
“Danishness” provided the source for an entire national (cultural and social) ideology, known today as 
“Grundtvigianism”. Though a major part of its intellectual inspiration was German, it was and is very 
articulate on the needs to look “inward” and cultivate allegedly specific Danish values (such as the 
People’s Democracy – Folkestyre – and Political Egalitarianism). 
10 Obvious in as diverse processes as Baden-Powell’s boy scout movement in Britain, eugenics 
movements all over Europe, nationalist sports movements and organizations for the masses, and the 
virtues and values prioritized highly in mass-educational curricula. 
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If this is valid, then it should sensitize us not just to the historical interconnectedness 
of democratic and more totalitarian developments in modern European history, but 
also to the relativity and contingency of nationalism in its European form. It may not, 
as I argued above, be the result of individual whim and subjective choices, but in light 
of the lessons later learnt by European political elites as regards the (in)adequacy and 
counter-productivity of the colonialist competitive strategies employed prior to WW I 
as well their destructive inter-war results, neither should they be treated as historically 
ineluctable imperatives. Different political strategies might have produced different 
results, less belligerent and exclusionary nationalisms – or none at all. Thus, also the 
“progressiveness” of nationalism as an instrument of late 19th century modernization 
warrants a closer critical look – though this is a project in its own right which cannot 
be undertaken here. 
 
Phase 2: In a sense, this phase both repeats and reverses the late-19th century 
experience in interesting ways. It has already been argued that whereas this latter turn 
marked an attempt by elite-driven, exclusionary nationalisms to reinvent the 
geographically limited and politically decentered globality of the 19th century in 
national terms and with national meaning, the late 20th century in many ways 
represents the opposite turn: from nationalism to globalism, or, some would argue, 
from an exclusionary to a cosmopolitan form of nationalism – a process where the core 
elites seem to forge ahead with a global project implying a reinterpretation of 
sovereignty, a refunctionalization of national borders and a refiguration of the 
nation/state compact, whilst more “populist” elites11 both inside and outside the party-
political landscape try to halt the slide toward globality and stick with the “old” order, 
or at least their perception of what things used to be like. 
 
This process can be analyzed as the inevitable abolition of the nation-state and the 
advent of the “machine” of Empire, as argued by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in 
their book entitled Empire (2000). The rationale is then the overarching logic of 
capitalism and its ever more expansive and hegemonic subsumption (or control) of all 
dimensions and spheres of life, a logic which demands that politics move beyond both 
nationalism and institutionalized inter-nationalism and assume an unmediated global 
“interventionist” form, legitimated by “exceptional” crisis situations (like the Gulf 
War and the interventions in ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan), which in fact are 
becoming more like the normal state of affairs.  
 
This perspective is undoubtedly valid in a number of ways, particularly in its 
insistence that there is a close link between the fate of the nation-state and its 
functionality (or the reverse) for the progress of the political economy of capitalism. In 
                                                 
11 By this term I mean to include intellectual and political personalities – Right as well as Left – whose 
resistance to the impending “dissolution” of the nation-state capitalizes on images and discourses of 
the “national soul”, “Volksgeist”, “ethnic roots” etc., and who in addition appeal directly to “the 
people” by proposing populist legislation (like stricter immigration controls) to ensure the “survival” 
of the national culture and identity. They become part of the elites if and when they become integrated 
into the established structures of power and opinion-formation. As far as their sociological origins are 
concerned, there seems to be little apparent regularity (between e.g. Haider, Schönhuber, Pia 
Kjærsgaard, Le Pen, Bossi and so forth). 
 11
brief form, Hardt and Negri argue that national sovereignty has declined dramatically 
because it no longer serves the interests of global business and is therefore being 
supplanted by a more global form of sovereignty through the creation of what they 
term Empire. To reinterpret them in the present context: whereas nationalism in the 
late 19th century worked well as the instrument and container of capitalist modernism, 
it it no longer functional and requires new forms of control and regulation – not a new 
imperialism (which is a creation of states), but an empire beyond states. 
 
The drawbacks to this kind of analysis of the ongoing turn of paradigm are partly that 
it does not identify the agents and institutions of “empire” clearly enough – it remains 
a rather mystical being, almost a political “invisible hand”; partly that it is too 
reductive and deterministic in its assumptions of a direct link between business 
(“base”?) and politics (“superstructure”?), along lines eerily reminiscent of some of the 
less productive sides of Althusserian structural Marxism; and partly that it does not 
properly investigate the changing roles and permutations of nationalism (probably 
because, like the nation-state, it is seen to be in inevitable decline), and hence is not 
concerned with taking discrete looks at nationalisms in different regions of the world, 
such as Europe. Put more simply, this analysis and others like it overstates its case by 
reducing certain complexities to the state of crude stereotypes. 
 
It seems to be a more fitting starting point to contend that European nationalism in this 
global age, while definitely undergoing a significant transformative process, finds 
itself between illegitimacy and panacea. On the one hand, it is being robbed of a 
number of the functions it was meant to serve and which were imparted to it some 
hundred years previously. On the other, it is still the repository of images and emotions 
deriving from that phase, has assumed other roles in the meantime that are are not yet 
superannuated, and, significantly, though the core elites may have jumped ship in a 
certain sense, in another are still deeply committed to it as their springboard of 
political influence in the world. Hence some agitate warmly for cosmopolitan variants 
of nationalism, for distinguishing between “patriotic” and “nationalist” and between 
working in favour of “national” and not “nationalist” interests (see the previous 
section), whilst other elite sections are doing their best to capitalize on programs that 
rest on maintaining or returning to the psychological and societal security of the “old 
order” of welfare and ethnic purity. Briefly, nationalism is responding to the global 
turn by reinventing itself, and can do so because different sections of the elites as well 
the national masses can see an interest in retaining a “project” which may no longer be 
in sync with the general thrust of the age, but which is still powerful enough to be 
invested with cultural and political meaning. This is true to such an extent that many of 
the processes which from one perspective can be analyzed as indications of the erosion 
and decline of nation-states and nationalisms, from another can be seen as attempts to 
– as Alan Milward has termed the phenomenon in an EU integration context – ”rescue 
the nation-state” (Milward, 1992). The same kind of analysis could be expanded to 
cover different versions of liberal and cosmopolitan nationalism, programs for the 
regulation of multiethnic and multicultural states, the division of sovereignty and 
decision-making capabilities between national and international institutions, the 
cooptation of transnational NGOs into national governance structures, the gradual 
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acceptance of ius soli principles of citizenship and of multiple citizenships by many 
national governments. 
 
There is no doubt that all this militates against the European blueprint of nation-state 
cohesion and rather exclusionary nationalism, that it represents a “package” which is 
still hard to swallow for European nation-states, and that it is put on the political (and 
cultural) agenda by the processes of globalism. It is important to recognize, however, 
not only that significant changes are occurring, but that they are occurring because 
nationalism like its political container, the nation-state, is not a fixed and immutable 
entity, but one that is malleable, multi-functional (Hedetoft, 1999) and historically and 
politically contingent. In the same way that its specific exclusionary form in the late 
19th and early 20th century was determined by key political actors and institutions on 
the background of the imperialist struggle between European powers that they chose to 
get involved in (and hence to mobilize their publics for), and not by “capitalist 
economic interests” in any direct or even indirect form, in the same way this 
belligerent framework of interest and identity formulation is not the indispensable 
repository for all kinds of nationalism – though admittedly it has left a European 
legacy of interpretation and sentiment that nations and states have had to struggle with 
in a serious way throughout the 20th century. This is also, however, where the most 
serious reversal of the European national predicament must be located, both now and 
in a historical perspective reaching back to the end of WW II: its relation to “war” and 
war’s significance for determining what national identity and virtues are or should be. 
 
Where in the late 19th century “war” and inter-state conflict determined nationalism as 
exclusionary and hegemonic and the nation/state nexus as homogeneous, after WW II 
the (partly externally imposed) commitment of European states to the project of never 
again waging wars against each other (and in some nation-states, especially Germany, 
to not getting involved in war or warlike activities at all) has played a major role in 
redefining nationalism as pacific national identity. In other words, whereas “war” in 
the first phase became a proactive element in the positive and future-oriented 
definition of what nationalism was all about (eclipsing in the all-out cultivation of war 
and sacrifice by Nazism), in the second it has developed into a signifier and catalyst of 
what it is not and of what has to be overcome in order to attain a state of genuine 
“nationality” and to evince mature citizen qualities. Belligerent nationalism is branded 
as the Negative Other of European history, to be shunned and overcome as a sign of a 
superior, more advanced and more democratic civilization, in comparison, that is, with 
other parts of the world where such practices and national identity definitions are still 
in vogue.  
 
The result of this process of political and popular redefinition is both complex and 
extraordinary: first, a stigmatization of nationalism (because nationalism is still widely 
interpreted as aggressive and belligerent per se); secondly a cultivation of moderate, 
but still inherently national qualities and loyalties which reside in people’s capacity to 
distinguish their own moderate “national identity” and acceptable ways of celebrating 
it (in sports contexts not least) from the illegitimate and offensive “nationalism” of the 
Others (Billig, 1995); thirdly, the capacity to undertake a discrete distinction between 
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the rejection of the national past as barbaric and the embrace of (much) the same past 
as the font of cherished national traditions, memories and legacies (see next section); 
fourthly, the willingness to (let) harness such sentiments to a variety of different 
political discourses and projects, some of which further global processes whilst 
attempting to constrain them (e.g. the EU), while others reintroduce exclusionary 
mental coordinates as instruments for the defense of the national home (e.g. anti-
immigration platforms) (see section 5); and finally, the launch or backing of new kinds 
of warfare (Hardt and Negri’s interventions of Empire), this time in the name of 
civilizational and democratic ideals, legitimated by the participation or condonement 
of supranational institutions like the UN, undertaken for the most part by the USA 
(and not EUrope), and with the alleged objective of reinstating “peace” to the region in 
question (further on this in section 5). 
 
This is a multifaceted package of European nationalism indeed – a reversal in some 
senses as compared with phase 1, a transformation and dislocation in others, and a 
continuation in other ways still. It is both nostalgic and extremely functional, both 
“cosmopolitan” (the discourses of high politics) and “exclusionary” (the “low” politics 
of culture, migration and so forth), both typified by tendencies of nation/state 
decoupling (elites going transnational) and nation/state reaffirmation (elites warmly 
embracing their electorates and affirming their exceptionalist qualities). More than a 
situation of “nations without states(men)”, this is a juncture characterized by still 
efficacious “nation-states without nationalism” – i.e. a situation where the practical 
cultivation of nationalism and national attachments is more or less officially decoupled 
from discourses and understandings of these phenomena as nationalist (let alone 
racist) – although a counter-tendency, reinstating such labels to acceptability once 
again, seems to be under way after September 11 and the focus on “national security” 
(section 5). Hence nationalist organizations which embrace such rhetoric nevertheless 
are, by definition, outside of the mainstream and for that reason are classified as 
“extreme” (whether right or left) – whether or not their actual policies diverge from 
mainstream policies or not.12 The following section will take a closer look at the role 
and fate of national movement(s) and proponents thereof in the two phases. 
 
4. NATIONAL MOVEMENTS: FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE, AND FROM 
NATIONALISM TO ETHNICISM 
Phase 1: It follows from what has been argued already that both the level and causes 
of societal (il)legitimacy and the mode and functionality through which national(ist) 
movements exist in the two phases are radically different. On one hand, this follows 
from the rather banal juxtaposition of a phase where nationalism, for the reasons 
given, is increasingly invested with positive values – and where movements set up in 
the name of the national cause are therefore seen to be both positive and progressive – 
                                                 
12 The case of the EU sanctions against Austria due to the participation of the Freedom Party in the 
new government provides an interesting example of how anti-immigrant political discourses and 
international perceptions thereof lead to punitive measures in the name of a defense of “humane 
values”, while many of the countries backing those measures had already put in place anti-immigrant 
policies that were just as harsh or even harsher (see e.g. Jones, 2000). 
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and another phase where the nation-state by and large exists in the indicative mode,13 
and where “national movements” are therefore either seen to be unnecessary or 
downright suspect, because they are associated with all the negative currency of 
outmoded nationalisms and racisms and are by and large perceived, by mainstream, 
consensual discourses, as regressive and nostalgic. Communities carrying the epithet 
“national” in their name and description of purpose, are bona fide as “associations”, 
“organizations” and “institutions”, but hardly as “movements” (see comments on 
“ethnic movements” under phase 2 below). In a sense, “national movements” in a 
“postmodernist”, global age is a notion that can hardly avoid the suspicion of being a 
contradiction in terms: “movement” indicates something progressive and future-
oriented, whereas “national(ist)” in the mainstream European context (things are 
different in other parts of the world) wears the mantle of conservatism and stasis.14 
This is all valid, but does not reveal the complexities of the entire story. For that, I 
believe, we have to dig deeper and relate these questions of political functionalism 
more directly and also more subtly to the issues discussed in sections 2 and 3. 
 
The combination of “nationalist” and “movement” around the turn of the 19th century 
signifies at the same time a social, a cultural and a political process of nation-state 
building in which the discrete “parts” (the different movements) legitimately 
represented – or at least aimed to represent – the ideal “whole”. As a discursive 
figuration, they could be thought of as a metonymic structure, a pars pro toto fuelled 
by the nation-constructing teleology of conjoining the diverse imagined parts of the 
ideal wholeness of the homogeneous nation-state both horizontally (integrating 
different parts of “national society” into a national community of destiny and mission) 
and vertically (shaping bonds of identification and loyalty between people and state). 
Boy-scout movements, athletics movements, eugenics movements, literary and 
musical societies, linguistic and historical associations, imperial movements, 
educational movements, and even religious, moral and ethnographic societies – and 
here I am not even counting overtly political movements – were all inspired by the 
nationalist ethos and its overriding purpose of breathing “authenticity, originality and 
continuity” (Gutierrez, 2001, p. 5) into the nation-state construct and, not least, getting 
this construct in shape for inter-national emulation with like-minded configurations in 
the surrounding world. 
 
It is undoubtedly this laborious, proactive process of creating unity and unison 
between societal groups, between nation and state, between micro and macro 
developments, between the young and the old, and between history and the present 
that made Renan, in his famous Sorbonne lecture of 1882, talk of nationalism as a 
“daily plebiscite” – a question of will, choice and civic virtues that was predicated on 
an individual socialization process and on active participation by the individual citizen 
in the affairs of the nation-state. National movements in this phase fits this image, in 
the sense that they functioned as organizational levers for the instillment and 
                                                 
13 Though this is not universally true for Central and Eastern Europe, nor for the multiple “diasporic” 
and “minority” communities living in all European states. 
14 This question of legitimate, “official” national(ist) discourse must be kept separate from the strength 
and durability of banal, everyday manifestations of national belonging. 
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maintenance both of “national consciousness” in a rather abstract sense (laying the 
foundation of what today we refer to as national identity, though a century ago the 
term “national character” was the preferred concept) and of practical civic loyalty to 
the national cause by each representing different dimensions of the “package” of 
national homogeneity. By means of these movements and the active intervention in 
them of what we could term the “national intelligentsia”, nationalism became 
transformed from being mainly a political ideology to being the most important 
referent of collective cultural identification and political allegiance.  
 
Whereas the distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” nationalisms, between 
“Western” and “Eastern” forms or between “civic” and “ethnic” is a useful 
classificatory matrix for earlier phases of the nation-building process in Europe, my 
contention is that around the turn of the 19th century this differentiation no longer 
matters, because now the “process” is turning into an international, symmetrical 
“project” proper, and a political one at that, where the state-induced instrumentalities 
of this modern, integrative as well as exclusivist project are of supreme significance 
for the purposes of the European states, which increasingly have come to see 
themselves through the eyes of the national Other and hence compete as both similar 
and very distinctive units (see earlier sections). The many different “movements” are 
on their way to coalescing into one grand national structure – and the success of the 
project explains why today we tend to speak as much of the nationalist movement as of 
nationalist movements in the plural. This is the phase, then, when nationalism is being 
completed, as a political project requiring wholesale backing of and allegiance to the 
state as one’s own and very unique preserver of “identity”. Clearly, democratic 
processes and movements played a part: Material and particularistic interests translated 
into existential, universalist positions by means of claims-making processes in the 
public arena and the political recognition of the social groups involved. But precisely 
because more was involved – states were interested in a much more encompassing and 
enduring form of nation/state “homogeneity” – such civic-political processes were not 
enough. 
 
In other words, the “political”, the “civic” dimension – Renan’s “plebiscite” – was a 
necessary but far from sufficient requirement for the completion of the nationalist 
project. The political or politically inspired movements had to be complemented by the 
more culturalist, historicist and existentialist-cum-religious ones. The daily plebiscite 
needed to base itself on images of national continuity, past glories and a “collective 
memory” of ethnic/racial belonging. Memory and amnesia had to be – and were – 
shaped and functionalized for the nationalist mission, inter alia through the writing of 
national histories, the launch of national museums and nationalist-imperialist 
exhibitions, the creation of national fiction, the orchestration of public ceremonies and 
public memorials that fitted the nationalist historical bill, and through a host of other 
policies and initiatives intended to harness the popular imaginary to the national 
cause.15 Further, as Gellner and many others have shown, elites were busy interpreting 
and representing special cultures, traditions and forms of interaction as national, and 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Dieckhoff & Gutierrez, 2001, for different contributions on these issues, and e.g. 
Mackenzie, 1984, for an in-depth analysis of how these processes were orchestrated in Britain. 
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breaches as continuities (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). The past was 
being functionalized for the present and the future, on a grander and more 
“hegemonic” scale than before, as “peasants” were being persuaded to view 
themselves and their life-chances as both active and still obedient members of “the 
French” nation-state (Weber, 1976; Dieckhoff, 2001) – or wherever they might have 
happened to be born. 
 
Phase 2: In a pithy formulation, if the relationship between national movements and 
the legitimate nationalisms of nation-states in phase 1 can be captured as a pars pro 
toto figure (the “real movement” as part representing the “ideal end-state” of a 
completed nationalism, a Utopia of coextensiveness between citizen and state), then 
the situation in phase 2 is in many ways reversed. Today the real, “indicative” nation-
state with its paraphernalia of banal nationalist manifestations and sentiments – i.e. the 
factual “toto” of the metonymic figure – is locked into a contest in which it is 
struggling not to be regarded as or relegated to the status of ideal “pars” by the 
combined forces of Europeanization and globalization – a Dystopia of eroded 
sovereignty, blurred cultural boundaries, multiple belongings (and citizenships) and a 
weakened historical rationale.16 State interests and national identities often find 
themselves at loggerheads within this contemporary configuration, in which – as 
argued earlier – the remaining popularity of national identity vyes with the ambiguous 
legitimacy of political nationalism.  
 
In turn this question relates to the issues of the contemporary rationale of nationalism, 
the role of memory and, particularly, the forms, normative status and agents of 
nationalist movements today. It would seem that today nationalism has lost most of the 
progressive, modernizing and state-buttressing potential that it possessed a century ago 
– and for that reason also the ideological and discursive optimism of pre-WW I 
outreach imperialism. To the extent that it enjoys quite some popularity and 
widespread attention (also among political and intellectual elites) nevertheless – as a 
kind of “New nationalism” in either a moderate (cf “constitutional patriotism”) or a 
“new racist” variant – this phenomenon should be understood in reactive and defensive 
terms. Memory and tradition are invoked to buttress or harness affective attachments 
and to justify that immigrant newcomers (other ethnies) do not belong in our culture; 
national identity and sovereignty in the classical mode are called on by a motley array 
of anti-globalists, national nostalgics and cultural gloom-and-doomers to ward off the 
imagined apocalypse of tomorrow; and new formulations (“cosmopolitan” or “liberal” 
nationalism) are invented in order to salvage the “civic” and non-belligerent 
dimensions of nationalism, to make it fit into the new global order of universal human 
rights and values, and most significantly to rid it of its aggressive connotations.  
 
Despite the great variety of these nationalist responses, they are linked to each other by 
three common denominators: they are reactive rather than proactive; they have little 
                                                 
16 An opaque reflection of this changing relationship can be found in IR Theory, in the difference 
between classical Realism and Neo-realism: in the former the nation-state is the primary and central 
“unit” which determines the nature of the “system”, in the latter the relation is reversed: now the 
“system” subsumes and defines the power and competences of its discrete parts, the “units”. 
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ideological content and future-oriented vision (i.e. they have been robbed of both their 
rationale and their positive normative status); and they do not constitute nationalist 
movements in any sense that is comparable to the situation a century earlier. In these 
senses, “the national” has cut itself off from the temporal linearity and progressive 
rationale of modernity – has possibly reached the “end of (its) history” and has entered 
what could be termed a musealized stage, where national cultures and identities – in 
fixed, stylized and sentimental formats – are suitable for touristic displays of folklore 
and other symbolic demonstrations of particularism and uniqueness, but not as the 
ideological wellspring and core rationale of state action. A number of caveats are 
needed, however, to get fully to grips with the complexities of this situation.  
 
First, it could be argued that movements to defend or preserve national cultures or 
languages, to limit immigration (because it is seen as a menace to national identities), 
or to oppose the European integration process do in fact constitute nationalist 
movements and do enjoy a lot of popular and some intellectual support as well (though 
both differ according to the country reviewed). This is true, but they are movements 
“in the reverse”, intent on preserving what is allegedly being lost, discursively on the 
defensive, and more often than not both marginalized from mainstream politics and 
public opinion. (Apart from this, most of these movements or parties feel compelled to 
legitimate their existence by developing alternative visions of international 
commitment and often participate actively in transnational networks.) 
 
Secondly, it could be contended that intellectual and political elites championing 
versions of liberal nationalism (like Third Way proponents or Habermas-inspired 
models for non-ethnic “nationalism” on a European scale), do in fact represent a 
future-oriented and ideological version of nationalism. However, whereas it is true that 
such programmatic formulations contain both visions for the future (however Utopian 
or unreal they might seem) and attempts to salvage nationalism, these two components 
are separate and intrinsically decoupled from each other. In other words they are not 
“nationalist programs”, i.e. political strategies premissed and dependent on their 
explicit nationalist content. On closer inspection, there exist in fact different kinds of 
caesura between the future orientation of the political substance and the defensive 
cultural salvage dimension of the nationalist formulations – conspicuous, for instance, 
in various ideas for the preservation of national identities in the EU, most of which are 
predicated on a separation between “culture” and “politics”. And as regards third-way 
programs, their nationalist dimension basically boils down to a concern for the 
destabilizing effects of globalization for the societal cohesion and the loyalty of 
peoples toward their political leadership, and hence, on closer inspection, comprises 
little more than rather vacuous appeals to civil society and individual citizens to 
demonstrate more maturity. 
 
Thirdly, it could be rightly argued that there are a number of extant preserves of 
nationalism and nationalist manifestations – like sports, cultural contests, civic 
heroisms, museum exhibitions dealing with national histories etc. This is undoubtedly 
a valid point, but it should be noticed that these domains of “legitimate nationalism” 
are relatively few, that they must primarily be analyzed as compensatory and 
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dislocated valves for the popular articulation of nationalism, based on the popularity 
that national identity still widely enjoys, and most importantly that they do not provide 
the basis for the creation of nationalist movements (with the exception of the cases 
where e.g. football supporter organizations are linked up with neo-nationalist and neo-
fascist politics – in which case they are covered by the first point above). 
 
Fourthly – and most importantly – a central counter-argument might be that 
organizations working for the recognition of national or ethnic or regional minorities 
in Europe are numerous, that they look to the future, often enjoy both legitimacy and 
ideological backing, and that they do constitute nationalist movements in a specific 
sense.  
 
In cases such as Scottish and Catalan “regional” nationalisms (Dickinson & Lynch, 
2000; Cultiaux, 2001), this argument makes a valid point, though in both these and a 
few other cases the political goal of national separatism is severely mitigated both by 
ambitions for federal set-ups within the multi-ethnic states in question and by strategic 
links with the EU, where it often pays off to retain regional status. Most often the 
above-mentioned separation between cultural nationalism and political attachments is 
significant in these cases too. The difference is that “indigenous culture” is often 
strategically harnessed to and instrumentalized for mainstream political objectives 
(nationally as well as internationally). For the same reasons, discourses of nationalism 
are here legitimate, though they need to be contained and occasionally be given a 
culturally reactive rather than political interpretation in order not to “get out of hand”. 
This is not a concern in cases such as Basque separatism or Northern Irish 
republicanism, which take the “old” nation-state paradigm so seriously that an 
explosive combination of nationalism, territorialism, religion and armed struggle is 
engendered, in almost a present-day travesty of the forms and substances “real” 
nationalism is supposed to possess.  
 
In the case of migrant organizations based on ethnicity and working for multicultural 
states, the situation is different, in the sense that, although they are no doubt social and 
political movements with a forward-looking agenda, they are “ethnic” rather than 
“national”, in other words represent, present themselves as, and gain their legitimacy 
through the very fact that they are not mainstream political initiatives and do not base 
their claims-making efforts on an ambition of nation-state homogeneity or a model of 
cultural assimilation as a basis for their identity construction. Though they act within 
the political confines of the nation-state and aim at integrating into and participating as 
citizen organizations in national societies, they simultaneously organize in 
transnational or diasporic networks and often around multiple forms of belonging and 
identity (Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002; Kymlicka, 2001). This is not the place to enter into a 
prolonged discussion of these “postmodern” forms of identity formation and socio-
cultural movements, except to argue that their quasi-legitimacy and forward-looking 
potential springs from the fact that in terms of both self-understanding and societal 
value ascription they are separate from nationalist movements in phase 1. The 
significant point is that these movements both match the “right to difference” 
recognized by the dominant paradigm of cultural relativism, and can be perceived as 
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striving for something akin to, but still different from the “pacific” form of European 
national identity that has developed after WW II. However, as just indicated, these 
movements and ambitions are only quasi-legitimate, since they also provide an 
important source of nationalist animosity for proponents of New Nationalist/New 
Racist movements (cf. the argument under firstly above). 
 
This brings me to the last section, which will be concerned with different Self/Other 
configurations in the two phases. 
 
5. ELITE DISCOURSE AND MASS PERCEPTION OF “THE OTHER” 
Phase 1: The hardening and political “securitization” of nationalism that took place in 
Europe around 1900 had a number of implications for the construction of “Self” vs 
“Other” in that period. The consensual legitimacy of nationalism was promoted by the 
imperial interests and mutual grievances in which European states were increasingly 
becoming embroiled – in the form of struggles for territory and economic and political 
resources. Unlike previous stages of the nation-building process in Europe,17 the 
politicization and burgeoning militarization of nationalism in this phase build on and 
strengthen a paradigmatic nationalism of absolute and rigidified lines of separation 
between “us” and “them”. The cultural entrepreneurs of nationalism were being 
supplanted by an intimate linkage between politicizing ideologues and ideological 
politicians (in some cases they are the same persons) taking advantage of the 
potentialities that nationalism offered them, supported by more or less sophisticated 
“theories” of scientific racism,18 theories which were frequently turned into ideological 
and political practice in the shape of various “eugenics” movements in practically 
speaking all the western European countries and North America as well. 
 
The significant point to push home is less that in this era we witness a powerful 
combination of nationalism and racism, and more that the attendant cultural-
ideological matrix of Self-adulation and absolutist images of Others, despite (or 
because) the objections and resistance of Socialism in many different guises, were 
legitimate, state-approved, often state-directed, “scientifically” ordered, and linked 
with the fierce inter-state competition and belligerent war climate existing among 
European states. Thus, racially underpinned state-nationalism (the power of which was 
apparent both in the French Dreyfus Affair, in the British war against the Boers and 
other colonial incalcitrants, and in Bismarck’s anti-socialist legislation) and its 
attendant exclusivist images of Others came to constitute the moral order of society, a 
Zeitgeist engineered by national elites for the masses – who became nationalized in the 
process.  
It is tempting to characterize this process as the epitome of European nationalism, due 
to the conflation of nation, race, state, politics, military ambitions, territoriality etc 
                                                 
17 Which were largely typified by educated elites arguing for and constructing the cultural, linguistic 
and ethnological foundations for national uniqueness and by a certain intermingling of cosmopolitan 
openness and national particularism. 
18 By this I understand hierarchically ordered categorizations of homo sapiens into different “races”, 
all characterized by a close link between “genotype” and “phenotype”. 
 20
within an overarching structure of rigid nation/state delimitations and consensual 
moral legitimacy. In a sense, and with the benefits of historical hindsight, this is even 
partly true – at least this is the phase in which European nationalism in many ways 
came closest to realizing (or fought each other to realize) the coextensivenss of 
politics, culture and territory which we refer to as nationalism. 
 
On the other hand, it is a truth which needs to be seriously tempered by at least two 
reflections. First, the cultural, historical and “mental” conditions for the construction 
of such absolutizing nationalisms were born and bred of colonialism (slavery, images 
of racial superiority and inferiority, quasi-feudal power autocracy, civilizing missions, 
capitalizing on mentalities of “subjects” rather than “citizens” etc.) rather than 
nationalism. In fact, the political ambitions providing the teleological core of the 
process transforming a “cosmopolitan” Europe into a “national” one had the trademark 
of territorial colonialism writ large, to such an extent that a more mature nationalist 
rationale later in the 20th century came to view both the ambitions and their 
instruments as misguided (the consequence, of course, was decolonization). And 
secondly, what has often been described as inter-state rivalry brought about by 
nationalist sentiments in an era of more or less embryonic popular rule (depending on 
the country in question), should more adequately be conceived as a statist process, 
with state actors playing the crucial proactive part, defining the interests to be pursued, 
while the national masses were being instrumentalized for objectives that were 
politically identified. In other words, in this unholy alliance of a colonial perceptual 
matrix and nation-building ambitions, nations and nationalisms played the role of 
condition and justification, but not of cause of the inter-state competition leading to 
WW I. 
 
As regards immigration and immigrants as a source and butt of hostile stereotypes, this 
is admittedly the phase in which such cultural constructions saw the light of day 
(particularly in the shape of anti-Jewish sentiments – see e.g. White, 1899), but it must 
be noted that their rationale and societal status were significantly different from today. 
Since the accepted climate of opinion and legitimate political strategies favoured an 
expansionist state-nationalism and rather hostile stereotypes of aliens, and since the 
political and ideological thrust was “outward” rather than “inward”, separate anti-
immigrant movements were rare. The race/migrant issue conflated with wider elite 
agitation and platforms regarding “foreigners”, who were mainly to be found outside 
of “our” borders. However, e.g. in the shape of debates related to “miscegenation”, the 
issue was beginning to be looked on as a cause for national-racial concern, mainly in 
terms of the widely debated “demoralization” and “degeneration” of the “imperial 
race” in Britain (and elsewhere as well), which on the one hand constituted the 
foundation for diverse attempts to breathe renewed life into the national spirit in order 
to reinforce the nation’s resolve and martial virtues, and on the other fed into the mind-
set of fin-de-siecle cultural pessimism which complemented the officially promoted 
optimism of the national cause in paradoxical ways (Cramb, 1900; Hedetoft, 1990; 
Mangan & Walvin, 1987). Nevertheless, even these debates were set in a much larger 
context than that provided by the immigrant issues themselves, sparked off by colonial 
uprisings, economic worries, and the inter-European rivalry itself. Succinctly put: 
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issues and questions related to “immigration” were subordinate to and contingent on 
those related to “war” (Hedetoft, 1995, chapters 1 and 6) – here understood as a 
symbolic referent of exclusivist foreign-policy ideology, cultural border demarcations, 
and nation/state unity. 
 
Phase 2: In contrast, the late 20th century, particularly following the “end of 
communism”, is the age and spirit of “intercultural collaboration” (rather than rivalry) 
and “ethnicity” (rather than “race”) – an age characterized by cultural relativism and 
the discursive softening of enemy imagery in Europe. These kinds of discourses, 
perceptions and (to some extent) practices are intimately bound up with the European 
integration project and its necessary abandonment of nationalist exclusivism as regards 
political and cultural interaction. It provides both the conditions and the justification 
for the widely accepted, Kantian-inspired tenet that war between democracies is now 
impossible and that “our civilization” has achieved a state of “perpetual peace”. The 
problem persists, however, both in the shape of the “real” Other (alien cultures, 
ethnicities and civilizations), but also in the dilution of national sovereignty and 
territorial demarcations which follows from the official pacifism of the age, from 
globalization, and from European integration as well. The two threat scenarios (“high-
political” clashes of civilizations and anxieties about what global and European 
developments might do to established national identities) coalesce in the creation of 
the “enemy within”, represented in the popular imaginary and media-disseminated 
stereotypes by innate and ineradicable features of “third world” migrants and refugees. 
The agents and vehicles of this nationalist backlash are anti-immigrant movements: 
“popular” rather than “elite” constructions, critical of “too liberal” state practices (and 
of state actors who either by design or by default are betraying the nationalist cause 
and the nation-state nexus through their transnational contacts) and advocating a return 
to a status quo ante. The immediate consequence is a polarization between a liberally 
minded, outward-oriented and muted nationalist frame of reference (attached to 
globality and European cooperation, and manifested in discourses of multiculturalism 
and ethnic diversity), and a discourse of national egoism and cultural preservation, 
feeding directly off a resistance to such policies and perceptions. 
 
Comparing this phase with phase 1, it is striking that issues and “problems” related to 
immigration cut themselves loose from those concerned with “war”, or possibly better 
formulated: the immigration arena turns into a dislocated war arena as regards rhetoric 
and symbolic currency. Dislocated from the core elites as well as from legitimate 
discourse, but holding significant sway over the popular imaginary. The 
immigrant/refugee Other becomes a repository of negative images, a kind of symbolic 
incarnation of all the ills coming to “us” from the outside, whilst being manifestly 
present in significant numbers among us. In this way, the hostile imagery of phase 1 – 
at least in terms of its formal properties – lives on at a societal “level” partly 
dissociated from official politics and legitimate national discourse and serving other 
functions and interests. Whereas in phase 1, the nationalizing elites undertook a 
homogenizing project for the masses in order, first, to integrate the “ethnic” minorities 
within the self-defined national territory into the nation-state compact, and, secondly, 
to contain “globalism” and to prevail in the embryonic international order, today this 
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kind of nationalism is chiefly represented “from below” and sees the global threat as 
coming from both from above (their traditional political representatives) and from 
without (the immigrant ethnic minorities and for some the European Union). One of 
the consequences is a discernible disillusionment about “normal” politics and growing 
disaffection with both political actors and processes. 
 
On the other hand, although there is a difference, there is no clear-cut dichotomy 
between the “cultural relativism” of the cosmopolitan elites and the “national 
exclusivism” of the “new-old” nationalists. There are mainly three reasons for this, one 
conceptual, the second political (power-related), and the third and most important 
historical: 
 
The first (conceptual) reason has to do with the relationship between essentialism on 
the one hand and racism and cultural relativism (or diversity), respectively, on the 
other. It has been rightly argued that although the link between essentialism and racism 
is explicit and clear-cut, this does not mean that cultural relativism is devoid of 
essentialist content. “Ethnicity” and “culture” are more modern notions and the 
assumption of a hierarchy of cultures has gone, but nevertheless “culture/ethnicity” 
stands in a direct line of descent from notions of “race” and are, at least in important 
variants, no less essentialistic (Blum, 2001; Wodak & Reisigl, 2000). Not just notions 
of cultural diversity and multiethnic societies, but also the tenets underlying the 
international order of nation-states, all build on the “objective”, i.e. permanent, 
inalienable and inherent, properties of the cultural units involved and their right to be 
socially respected and politically recognized (Parekh, 2000). In the context of the 
present argument, “race” is a notion and a discourse deriving from the “self-other” grid 
of the national-imperialist phase (it carries the hallmarks of classical colonialism), 
whereas “ethnicity” or “culture” are imbricated with the later and more enlightened 
phase of national modernity. At the same time, more “orthodox” racism persists, both 
in institutional practices and popular perception, under the protective umbrella of a 
legitimate discourse of cultural relativism, i.e. a specific form of more or less reluctant 
“Other recognition” which sets this form of essentialism apart from the racism of 
phase 1. 
 
The political reason relates to the usefulness of “self-other” nationalism for the elites 
and their many different ways of capitalizing on it. Maintaining, sometimes even 
fuelling, hostile images of immigrants or asylum-seekers among the ethno-national 
majority populations is an indispensable and rather gratuitous instrument in the arsenal 
of discursive remedies at the disposal of political actors looking for ways and means to 
counteract political disenchantment or at least siphon it in directions less harmful to 
themselves. In spite of the inroads made by transnational processes on the “identity 
bind” between states and peoples and in spite of the increasingly global orientation and 
networking of political elites, they still need to be concerned about their respective 
national arenas as the sine qua non of their political mandate and their admission ticket 
to global influence. Hence they do their best to try to adapt popular attitudes to 
foreigners to their own ends by being tough on immigration, but also to project an 
image to the outside world of themselves and their countries as guarantors of humane 
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values and civilized behaviour. The consequent balancing act between different 
discourses, between discourses and policies, and between policies and practices is not 
always successful, as both the Austrian sanctions case and the recent Danish debate 
over the closing of the Danish Center for Human Rights have clearly demonstrated, 
but the fact that it is being enacted in all European countries is evidence of vested, 
structurally embedded political interests in capitalizing on popular fears of 
immigration while simultaneously promoting or at least taking advantage of those 
same global processes (see the analysis of different national parliamentary debates 
over immigration policies in Wodak & van Dijk, 2000). Hence, though there may be 
differences between mainstream politics and “right-wing”, anti-immigrant parties as 
regards principles, values and “ideology”, there is also considerable common ground 
as regards immigration issues and questions of national-cultural exclusivism and 
belonging in that respect. While at some point this coalescence may have been due to 
tactical considerations among mainstream parties – trying to hold on to angry, volatile 
voters by projecting themselves as hardliners too – , recently there seems to be a more 
profound change of values and attitudes underway, a notable shift of “perceptual 
paradigm”. This has to do with the third reason. 
 
The last half-decade or so has seen an emerging challenge to the paradigm of cultural 
relativism and a revival of a grander narrative in the form of legitimate discourses of 
civilizational clashes and the securitization of population movements, e.g. in the form 
of projections of terrorism and the threat that it constitutes to “universal, democratic 
values”. Of course such discourses in and of themselves – e.g. Barber (1995), 
Huntington (1996), Juergensmeyer (2001) etc – are embedded in outward-oriented, 
“global” (and very American) perspectives, interests and values, and thus align 
themselves with cosmopolitanism rather than introspective nationalism. It should not 
be overlooked, however, that the practical political consequences of this reinstatement 
of a (new) conflation between a spirit of militant alertness (“war”), migration and 
Othering are a securitization and legitimation of not only the migration area (and 
attendant stereotypes) as such, but of this area at the level of national politics and 
border controls. This trend was not created by but certainly received a boost from the 
events of September 11, 2001, to such an extent that it is currently acceptable and 
above-board not just to curtail traditional civic liberties in the “security interests of 
state”, but also to combine – discursively as well as in political practice – the former 
“micro-politics” of immigration controls with the “macro-politics” of world affairs.  
 
What seems to be happening is a double process of re-legitimation of hostile 
stereotypes and national heterotypes: on the one hand, the immigration domain is 
moving from a position of “dislocation” (in the sense laid out above) to one of 
centrality (hence it was able to take center stage in the recent parliamentary elections 
in Denmark and is being tabled as central in the upcoming German elections too); and 
on the other it is, as in phase 1 (but within a different logic), being conflated with and 
subsumed under “larger” issues of state, war and security – or to put it differently, 
“immigration” is being reappropriated by the political imaginary of state actors. This 
time around, however, this nation-state revival within a context of militant emergency 
is happening in the name of human rights and democratic values worldwide and 
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spearheaded by self-styled cosmopolitans. However, since charity begins at home, it is 
the home turf of nation-states that is perceived to be most seriously under attack both 
from within and without. The result in cultural terms is a new national morality of 
cynicism, a self-righteous spirit of ruthlessness-in-a-good-cause, from the Atlantic to 
the Adriatic (to mimic a famous Churchillian formulation of external danger). It would 
seem that somehow phase 1 has come back with a vengeance – the spirit of absolute 
values is with us again, pejorative images of the Other are legitimate, masses and elites 
are pulling together, and even explicit biological racism is being revived.  
 
In the short term, nations and nationalisms are the benefactors of this apparent demise 
of cultural relativism and increased scepticism against multicultural policy solutions 
(even in a country like Sweden, renowned for its steadfast adherence to 
multiculturalism). However, it is far from certain that this might not eventually prove 
to be a transitional stage in a long-term process of diminishing or at least 
refunctionalizing the role of European nation-states in and for a more global order of 
the future. If so, it would not be without some historical irony: The martialism of 
phase 1 eventually brought about a weakening of nationalism in Europe; this time it 
might well be the midwife of a thoroughgoing global order dominated by the 
American hegemon.  
 
6. A CONCLUSION 
My two introductory questions were, to put it briefly, (1) if what we are seeing now is 
little more than a repeat performance of the national/global nexus some one hundred 
years ago, and (2) how mass/elite interactions today shape up in comparison with the 
late 19th century, e.g. in the perspective of nationalist movements and their forms, 
functions and legitimacy in the two phases. 
 
As regards the first issue, the analysis has indicated that the interface between 
nationalism and globality in the two phases is distinctive and cannot be conceived as 
either coterminous or as different manifestations of the same fundamental pattern. In a 
certain sense the two processes are reversals of each other: late 19th-century 
developments mark a process in which a rather borderless (and partially uncharted and 
therefore “conquerable”) transnational world is being appropriated and reshaped by 
nation-states and political nationalisms, and where the politicization and securitization 
of national interests and identities weld nations and states, masses and elites into 
unified wholes through discourses and practices of war, exclusivism and Self-
adulation. Phase 1 represents a peculiar and unique mix of colonial/imperial interests 
and national forms – one which impacts notions and ideals (positive as well as 
negative) of national identity throughout the 20th century in profound ways. 
 
In an interesting sense this process has been reversed in the late 20th century. The 
specific forms of transnational interaction which were born and bred of nation-states 
and their extraneous interests have produced a series of “global” processes – a new 
borderless world of sorts – which are currently challenging the nation-states 
themselves and producing new and historically unique mixes of the National and the 
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Global. The kind of globality lying in wait for us is clearly not just a reproduction of 
19th-century empires. First, it springs from nation-states and national interests and 
needs to assimilate and reshape them; and second, it is much more ubiquitous, 
powerful and “truly” global than the rather limited and truncated forms which 19th-
century imperialism assumed. In spite of apparent similarities (not least the return of 
cultural diversity and multicultural politics – and the current reactions against this 
complex in the name of security against outside dangers), contemporary processes 
must be regarded as sui generis. This does not mean, however, that they are 
dissociated from the political and cultural events round the turn of the 19th century. 
What this paper has tried to argue is in fact quite different: i.e. that phase 1 created a 
nationalist legacy (a historically specific vision of nationalism and national identity) 
which has set a general standard for what nationalism is and hence what should be 
embraced or rejected – a mental and normative paradigm which still co-determines the 
trajectory of cultural and international relations in a myriad uneven and asymmetrical 
ways (of which only some have been examined in this paper). In other words, rather 
than assuming that phase 2 is a replica or a continuation of phase 1, there is a 
significant element of historical interpretation tying them together. 
 
It is the dimension of unevenness and asymmetry which sets mass/elite interactions 
today apart from the late 19th-century nexus. Whereas the nationalization of the 
masses was a rather unidirectional homogenizing process – the “nations” being 
nationally integrated and mobilized in a linear process of subsumption under the 
imperial interests of states – the bind today is multidirectional, liminal and uneven 
(both within countries and in cross-national comparison). Sometimes some elite 
sections pursue state interests through the mobilization of popular sentiment 
(particularly in matters of immigration), but more often this is not a legitimate or a 
practical way of conducting politics. Interest articulation and identity formation only 
partially overlap, something which also applies to the arena of ethnic identity politics. 
For the nostalgics (and they can be found all across the political spectrum and at all 
levels of society) – i.e. those who still adhere to an image of old-style national politics 
– the global imposition on the nation/state nexus constitutes an intolerable affront 
which must be opposed. The nation-state should be reinvigorated, sovereignty 
reasserted, homogeneity restored. Globalization should either be reversed or firmly 
subordinated to national interests and identities. However, the more the nostalgics 
attempt to return to the safety of the national nest (often in its welfare-state 
permutations), the more their dramatic discourses reveal themselves as reactive and 
their political nationalism as qualitatively different from the reality underlying the 
ideal they conjure up. In brief: whereas European nationalism round the turn of the 
19th century was a weapon in the struggle over global resources, today it has largely 
turned into a bulwark against the encroachments of globality on the framework 
investing it with symbolic meaning: the nation-state. In this sense it has become 
increasingly self-referential, has developed into its own justification, and is only able 
to fulfill historical functions by subordinating itself to the demands of political and 
economic forces which by nature are transnational. 
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